Sex Ratios: a destabilizing factor?

Unmarried young men have been cited as an acceleration to a wide variety of social ills, from political unrest to rising crime rates (Messner & Sampson (1991); Posner (1992); Barber (2000); Hudson & De Boer (2002)). China's One-Child Policy has coincided with a growing sex disparity reflected in Chinese demographic data. The previous generation's preference for a son and the increased accuracy and affordability of ultrasound technology that can instantly determine the sex of a fetus, when combined with the Policy's restriction of urban Han Chinese families to one child, have been a primary cause of this demographic shift ((Zeng et al. (1993); Miller (2001); Chu (2001); Li (2002); Yang & Chen (2004); Das Gupta (2005)). This shift ensures that there will be a significant amount of young males in China who are not able to find spouses. This article seeks to explore how this will impact the stability of Chinese society, particularly in the areas of crime and political unrest.

The sex disparity between young men and young women in the 16-25 yr old range (traditional age of a first marriage in China) increased by almost 80% from 1988 through 2004, when the first children born of the One-Child Policy were coming of marriageable age. (Edlund et al. (2007)).

The coincidence of the One-Child policy with increased standard of living measures throughout the country and decreased population growth rates (particularly amongst the historically crime prone 18-24 yr old demographic) has in many ways helped isolate sex disparity as a variable in this evaluation. Traditionally, societies which have increasing sex differentials and increased crime rates also have increased economic disenfranchisement and demand for resources in this demographic. Economic strain and resource scarcity are both heavily correlated with increased crime and unrest, making it exceptionally difficult for a analyst to isolate the effect of sex disparity. In China's case, however, relative prosperity and access to wealth has actually increased during this same time period, driving analysts to look for other casual relationships. This post postulates that sex disparity is one such causal factor.

One caveat to this analysis is the fact that a better economic situation may in many ways be an indirect cause to more crime. As previously subsistence-based groups are able to now participate nominally in a consumer economy, energies previously directed towards survival may be reoriented towards accumulation of wealth. As neighbors, friends, and family begin to acquire 'luxury' goods such as TVs, mobiles, clothing, etc, social envy among the particularly emotional 18-24 yr old group may emerge. Add to that this generations high-exposure to consumption-based advertising through media and lack of experience with 'rugged' socialism of the Cultural Revolution, and you have a generation ripe for consumption by any means, to include crime.

Mitigating this factor, however, has been the continuing increase in wealth among these generations. As their consumption desires have increase, so has, for the most part, their ability to participate in consumerism. Moreover, the overall national mood of hope and belief in a more prosperous future (need citation here, I have seen these studies, but cannot remember where) imbibes youth with a sense that participation in the legal status-quo will inevitably enable to them to consume more as time goes on. Even in rural areas where there is dissent regarding the pace of economic development, the crux of the complaint is that certain individuals are not getting wealthier as fast as others (especially in urban areas). Implicit in this complaint is an acceptance that one is still getting more wealthy. So long as that is true, there is a material and emotional incentive for this young demographic to operate within the law. Although the effects require further study, it is presumably a small overall consideration in explaining higher crime rates.

During the period between 1988-2004, criminal offenses rose nearly 12.5% annually, and arrest rates rose 82.4% (population adjusted)(Hu (2006); Edlund et al. (2007). 16-25 yr old men were 60-70% of these arrests (Hu (2006); Law Yearbook of China (2001), a number well disproportionate to population makeup. Since the one-child policy was implemented at a local level, with a disparity in timing of up to ten years in some cases, one can compare the movement of arrest rates to that of Policy implementation. Using this methodology to isolate for the correlation between Policy inception and crime increase, the increasing sex disparity in the Chinese population may account for as much as 1/7 of the overall rise in crime (Edlund et al. (2007)). This same study also indicates that it is more than just 'maleness' that drives this trend; rather, 'unmarried maleness' is the significant variable in determining crime rates.

The long term implications are ambiguous. The great majority of females (who were not selected against in the womb or at birth) have benefited from more education, attention, care, and expectation than any generation in Chinese history. Presumably these women will go on to have families that show little to no sex-based preference, and in the long-term there will be a significant decrease in the overall sex disparity. The question remains, however, will second generation females be empowered to not choose marriage, thus perpetuating the trend? As studies consistently show higher academic achievement rates for females in Chinese society, will these women show less of an inclination to be married early. Data thus far already indicates a later marriage age for only-child females. If this generation is able to delay marriage, and exert more discrimination in choosing a spouse (enhanced by the relative abundance of men on the marriage market), this will only perpetuate a 'lost generation of men' at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid during this vulnerable age. This is particularly disconcerting in the long term.

Several remedies to this present themselves, and have already been observed in China and neighboring countries. First, the invigoration of monastic life in China provides an outlet and a 'catch' for young men as it has historically in Southeast Asia. As china loosens religious controls, this becomes an option. However, if a family has only one son, and the state welfare system continues to place the burdens of elder care on children individually, a humble and impoverished life as a monk is an increasingly untenable option. Furthermore, unrest in Tibet continues to slow government support for or even tolerance of Buddhist religious orders in Western regions.

Military Service provides a second option. Historically, this has provided much-needed jobs and stability world-wide for this generation of men. However, as China seeks to professionalize its military force, universal conscription is unlikely to be a persistently desirable option. Volunteer forces may provide some options; however, Chinese military forces are likely to shrink in the long term. Furthermore, unlike monastic clergy, military service provides only a temporary solution. Although it may allow men to delay marriage in the short-term, military service does not assuage the log-term marriage requirement.

The third option, already readily observable, is the importation of spouses from neighboring countries, particularly Mongolia and Vietnam. Culturally similar, these groups are able to assimilate into traditional roles in Chinese society. Their relatively subjugated positions may also serve to perpetuate a son preference in the long-term, effectively offsetting some of the mitigation of this preference demonstrated by the previously discussed generation of only-child Chinese females.

Readying the Umbrella before the Rain

A Chinese idiom calls on the wise man to prepare the umbrella before the rain. When Deng Xiaoping looked to China's future as the country emerged from the turbulent mid-twentieth century, the 'rain' he foresaw was the tremendous demand that China's rapidly growing population would put on resources just as China was beginning to emerge from 40 years of isolation. His response to this potential Malthusian catastrophe, China's One-Child Policy, is one of the greatest social and demographic experiments in human history. The policy effectively limits ethnic Han Chinese couples in urban areas to one child, with severe penalties for infractions. In the 29 years since policy inception, China has created an entire generation of single-child elites in the country. This generation has just begun to ascend the ranks of government, economic, and cultural leadership, and will have a tremendous impact on the character of PRC decision-making in coming years. When considered along side the already significant and growing importance of China in global affairs, the impact this generation will have on the future of humanity is unprecedented for a single, artificially constructed sociological group.

I intend this blog to focus on the critical questions that arise from this phenomenon that any diligent China watcher must ask. Some potential discussions include:

1. What does this transformation mean for the role of women in the Chinese pol-mil structure
2. What does psychology tell us about the character of only-child leadership. How does Chinese culture affect this (most studies are done on Westerners)?
3. How will this affect population demographics
4. How will the One-Child Policy affect traditional lines of power and action- without brothers/sisters/aunts/uncles/cousins, will 'Guanxi' survive as a primary means of getting things done?
5. Is this model readily exportable to other nations with pressing populations?

Unlike many similar blogs, I am less interested in a normative evaluation of the policy and more interesting in describing the ultimate effects such a policy will have on the political, economic, and cultural future of China. I invite comments and questions, as well as submissions.